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We extend Weitzman's (1998) recombinant growth framework to include
endogenous R&D decisions. The analysis is carried out in the (knowledge-
capital) state space by means of two characteristic curves: one is identi¯ed as a
turnpike along which growing economies evolve; the other attracts stagnating
economies. Sustained growth depends on a condition relating the slopes of
the characteristic curves as well as on a minimal endowment requirement. A
growing economy reaches the turnpike at a most rapid R&D rate and evolves
along it thereafter. In the long run, the rate of growth and the income shares
devoted to R&D, saving and consumption approach constant values that depend
on the asymptotic characteristic slopes.
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As technological progress is driven by assets loosely labelled as knowledge or
human capital, understanding economic growth requires unfolding the mechanism
through which these assets are accumulated. The endogenous growth literature pre-
dominately follows the original works of Romer (1986, 1990), Lucas (1988), Gross-
man and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992).1 In these studies the
(sought-after) balanced long-run growth is obtained by imposing certain restric-
tions on the knowledge generation mechanism (Solow 2000). Weitzman's (1998)
recombinant mechanism addresses these issues. In this mechanism, existing ideas
are combined to generate new ideas. The number of new combinations is a combi-
natorial function of the number of existing ideas, and if this number were the only
limiting factor in knowledge production, the model would give rise to an unrealistic
super-exponential growth. Turning a potentially fruitful idea into useful knowledge,
however, requires R&D e®orts that consume resources. Weitzman (1998) assumes
that a constant (exogenous) share of output is allocated to R&D and obtains bal-
anced long-run growth. The limit to growth in this model stems not from lack of
new ideas but from the limits on R&D resources that can be devoted to turn new
ideas into useful knowledge.
In this work we extend Weitzman's (1998) recombinant growth framework to
allow for endogenous R&D decisions. We provide a complete dynamic characteri-
zation and derive the conditions that give rise to sustained growth. The analysis
is carried out in the (knowledge-capital) state space in terms of two characteristic
curves, of which one is identi¯ed as a turnpike along which growing economies evolve
and the other attracts stagnating economies. The turnpike approaches a straight
1For recent literature see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) and Helpman (2004).
1line at large knowledge levels while the stagnation curve turns out to be linear at all
knowledge levels. A necessary growth condition is speci¯ed in terms of the slopes
of these characteristic lines. Qualifying economies have the capacity to grow but
need su±cient endowment to realize their growth potential. When the growth con-
ditions are met, the knowledge-capital processes reach the turnpike at a most rapid
R&D rate and evolve along it thereafter, eventually growing at a constant rate and
devoting constant shares of income to R&D, saving and consumption.
Our method of analysis applies to situations in which investment in knowledge
(or human capital) generation consumes a share of income and has been used to
study other endogenous growth models (Tsur and Zemel 2004, 2005). As such
knowledge investment rules are not uncommon (see, e.g., Shell 1967 and Chapter 5
of Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004), the analysis extends beyond the present case of
recombinant growth.
The next section revisits Weitzman's (1998) recombinant framework and formu-
lates it in continuous time with endogenous R&D decisions. Section 3 motivates
the endogenous formulation as the outcome of a competitive economy with knowl-
edge as a regulated public good. Section 4 provides the dynamic characterization
and establishes the properties of balanced growth. Section 5 presents an example
illustrating the general results for a Cobb-Douglas economy. Section 6 concludes
and an appendix contains technical derivations and proofs.
2 Formulation
Weitzman's (1998) knowledge generation mechanism is driven by the combina-
torial power of hybridizing existing ideas to generate progeny ideas, which are then
recombined with new and old ideas to generate yet newer ideas and so on. In
Weitzman's (1998) notation, A(t) stands for the stock of knowledge (useful ideas)
2at time t, Cm(A) is the number of di®erent combinations (or hybrids) of m elements
of A (e.g., C2(A) = A(A ¡ 1)=2) and
H(t) = Cm(A(t)) ¡ Cm(A(t ¡ 1))
is the number of new m-combinations (or seed ideas) formed during time period t.
In a continuous time formulation we treat A, Cm and H as continuous functions
and relate the rate at which new seed ideas are generated to the rate of change of
knowledge stock according to
H(t) = C0
m(A(t)) _ A(t): (2.1)
In fact, not every seed idea contributes to the state of knowledge. The probability
¼ of a seed idea turning into useful knowledge depends on R&D e®orts devoted
for this purpose. According to Weitzman (1998), a fraction s of net output Y is
invested in R&D e®orts to hybridize H seed ideas. This R&D expenditure generates
H¼(sY=H) useful new ideas that contribute to the knowledge base A. Knowledge,
thus, evolves according to
_ A(t) = H(t)¼(s(t)Y (t)=H(t)): (2.2)
The success probability ¼ satis¯es ¼(0) = 0;¼0 > 0;¼00 · 0 and ¼(1) · 1.














represents the expected unit cost of knowledge production. The function ©(A) is
non-increasing and the limit
lim
A!1
©(A) = 1=¼0(0) > 0 (2.5)
3measures the expected unit cost when seed ideas abound.
The knowledge production process (2.3) is incorporated within the standard
neoclassical framework, in which output is produced by capital and knowledge-
augmented labor according to
Y (t) = F(K(t);A(t)L); (2.6)
where F is concave and linearly homogenous with FK = @F=@K (= F1) and
FA = @F=@A (= F2L) denoting the marginal productivity of capital and knowl-
edge, respectively, and F11 < 0, F22 < 0 and F12 ¸ 0. To focus attention on
endogenous growth, we assume that labor L is constant.
Our departure from Weitzman (1998) concerns the shares of income devoted to
R&D and saving. Weitzman (1998) takes the R&D and saving shares as behavioral
parameters, while here they are determined endogenously. Given the R&D share
s(t), capital evolves according to
_ K(t) = (1 ¡ s(t))Y (t) ¡ Lc(t); (2.7)
where c(t) is per capita consumption at time t, generating the instantaneous utility
u(c(t)) for some increasing and strictly concave function u(c). The endogenous
R&D-saving-consumption policy is the outcome of





subject to (2.3)-(2.7), 0 · s(t) · 1, and other feasibility (e.g., non-negativity)
constraints, given the endowment K(0) = K0 and A(0) = A0. In (2.8), ½ is the
utility discount rate and the upper bound on s corresponds to investing all income
in R&D and eating-up capital to ¯nance consumption.
43 A competitive rationale
It might be objected that the optimal policy corresponding to (2.8) does not
describe competitive behavior because it maximizes aggregate welfare ignoring the
public good nature of knowledge. We present, therefore, a regulated competitive
economy with a public good (knowledge) that gives rise to (2.8).
The stylized economy consists of an R&D sector, an output producing sector,
identical households and a regulator. The R&D ¯rms that transform the seed ideas
into useful knowledge are ¯nanced by taxing household income at the rate s(t).2
Households own capital and labor, and derive income by renting these production
factors to output producing ¯rms.
Output producing ¯rms operate in a competitive environment and seek to max-
imize instantaneous pro¯t. At each point of time ¯rm i rents capital Ki and hires
labor Li to produce a composite good according to the linearly homogenous pro-
duction function Yi = F(Ki;ALi) = ALif(k=A), taking as given the labor wage
w, the capital rental rate r and the state of knowledge A, where k = Ki=Li and
f(x) = F(x;1).3 The capital demand condition is
f0(k=A) = r (3.1)
and the labor market clearing condition requires that per worker pro¯t vanishes,
i.e.,
Af(k=A) ¡ rk ¡ w = 0: (3.2)
From (3.2) and (2.6), the household income y(t) is given by
y(t) = r(t)k(t) + w(t) = A(t)f(k(t)=A(t)) = Y (t)=L: (3.3)
2This is evidently an abstraction, emphasizing the public good nature of knowledge and ignoring
issues such as intellectual property rights and patent race.
3Firms using the same technology and facing the same market conditions employ factors at the
same capital/labor ratio k hence the subscript i can be dropped.
5Given that a fraction s(t) of their income is collected as taxes to ¯nance R&D,
households allocate the remaining income (1 ¡ s(t))y(t) between consumption c(t)
and saving _ k(t),
_ k(t) = (1 ¡ s(t))y(t) ¡ c(t); (3.4)
and enjoy the instantaneous utility u(c(t)). The present value of a utility stream




The household seeks the feasible consumption plan c(t) that maximizes (3.5)
subject to (3.4), given the initial capital k0. In solving this problem, the household
takes the tax policy s(t) and the ensuing knowledge process A(t) (treated as a public
good and evolving according to (2.3)) as exogenous functions of time.
The regulator's role is to determine the tax policy s(t). Multiplying (3.4) and
(3.5) by L gives (2.7) and the objective of (2.8). Thus, the optimal tax policy,
which fully accounts for the public good nature of knowledge, is determined by the
social allocation problem (2.8).
4 Growth patterns
We characterize here the patterns of growth generated by (2.8), expressed more
conveniently in terms of the per-capita stock k = K=L and the per-capita unit cost
of knowledge production
'(A) = ©(A)=L:
The analysis is carried out in the (A;k) state space by means of two characteristic
curves that divide the space into distinct regions and impose restrictions on the
6R&D behavior in each of these regions. The salient features of the solution are
presented here while the detailed derivations are relegated to the appendix.
The ¯rst curve, denoted ~ k(A), consists of the locus of (A;k) states satisfying
Fk(k;A) = FA(k;A)='(A): (4.1)
Equation (4.1) can be interpreted as a no-arbitrage condition, implying that along
~ k(A) the marginal productivity of capital investment equals that of knowledge in-
vestment. Recalling that F(k;A) = Af(k=A), this condition reduces to z(k=A) =
'(A), where the function z(x) = f(x)=f0(x)¡x is increasing with z(0) = 0. Solving
for k, we obtain
~ k(A) = z¡1('(A))A: (4.2)
As shown in the appendix, the curve ~ k(A) traces the unique locus in the (A;k)
space along which both knowledge and capital grow simultaneously. The tendency
to equate the marginal productivity of knowledge with that of capital stems from
the observation that both factors compete for shares of the same income source. In
the (A;k) region where capital is more productive at the margin, giving up some
capital to ¯nance knowledge accumulation implies an income loss exceeding the
gain generated by the additional knowledge, hence R&D e®orts are not warranted.
Along ~ k(A) capital and knowledge are equally productive at the margin and the
household is indi®erent between investing in one or the other.
The second characteristic curve, denoted ^ k(A), consists of the locus of (A;k)
states where the capital rental rate r = f0(k=A) (see 3.1) equals the discount rate ½
f0(k=A) = ½: (4.3)
Since f0(k=A) = Fk(k;A) is decreasing, (4.3) can be solved to yield
^ k(A) = f0¡1(½)A ´ ^ ´A (4.4)
7and ^ k(A) is the straight line emanating from the origin with the slope ^ ´ = f0¡1(½).
The signi¯cance of the characteristic curves ~ k(A) and ^ k(A) is stated in:
Proposition 1. Economies that sustain long run growth ¯rst reach ~ k(A) at a most
rapid R&D rate, setting s(t) = 1 while above ~ k(A) or s(t) = 0 while below it,4 and
evolve along ~ k(A) thereafter. Economies that fail to grow in the long run eventually
reach a steady state on ^ k(A).
In view of the proposition, we refer to ~ k(A) and ^ k(A) as the turnpike and the
stagnation line, respectively. Economies that sustain growth in the long run are
called growing, while those that converge to a steady state (on the stagnation line)
are called stagnating. We turn now to specify the conditions for long run growth.
Let





A ´ ~ ´A (4.5)
be the straight line emanating from the origin with the slope ~ ´ = z¡1 (1=(L¼0(0))).
In view of (2.5) and (4.2), ~ k(A) approaches ~ k1(A) as A increases and we refer to
~ k1(A) as the asymptotic turnpike.5 Since '(A) is non-increasing, the turnpike lies
above the asymptotic line, ~ k(A) ¸ ~ k1(A).
The slope di®erence (^ ´ ¡ ~ ´) determines the relative positions of the stagnation
line and the asymptotic turnpike, and serves as the basis for the following growth
condition:
Proposition 2. Economies for which
^ ´ ¡ ~ ´ > 0 (4.6)
holds have the potential to sustain long run growth. Economies for which the reverse
condition holds eventually stagnate.
4An economy lies above (below) ~ k(A) if its capital exceeds (falls short of) ~ k(A) when its knowl-





m¡1), hence limA!1[~ k(A) ¡ ~ k1(A)] = 0 for m > 2.
8Having the potential to grow (i.e., satisfying condition (4.6)) does not ensure
sustained growth, as realizing this potential requires su±cient resources (see Propo-
sition 3 below). Condition (4.6) is readily interpreted. As stated in Proposition 1,
a growing economy eventually evolves along the turnpike and its long-run marginal
productivity of capital de¯nes, according to (3.1), the long-run capital rental rate
r1 ´ lim
A!1
f0(~ k(A)=A) = lim
A!1
f0(~ k1(A)=A) = f0(~ ´): (4.7)
Thus, recalling that f0 is decreasing, (4.6) is equivalent to
r1 = f0(~ ´) > f0(^ ´) = f0(f0¡1(½)) = ½; (4.8)
i.e., the long-run equilibrium interest rate exceeds impatience { a familiar growth
condition.







´ ¾ ¸ 1: (4.9)
The following characterization holds:
Proposition 3. Suppose that the growth condition (4.6) is satis¯ed. To any initial
knowledge stock A0 there corresponds a threshold capital stock ksk(A0) ¸ 0, such
that when k0 ¸ ksk(A0) the economy reaches in the long run a balanced growth path





















1 + ~ ´L¼0(0)
¶
(4.12)
9are devoted to investments in knowledge and capital, respectively. If k0 < ksk(A0)
the economy eventually stagnates.
A few observations are noteworthy. First, (4.10) agrees with the familiar Ram-
sey's rule (Ramsey 1928, equation 9). Second, (4.11) veri¯es that Weitzman's (1998)
assumption (of a constant income share devoted to R&D) is consistent with opti-
mizing behavior, albeit only in the long run and subject to the growth conditions.
Third, a growing economy invests in the long run the share s1+sk
1 = g1=r1 of its
income and consumes the remaining share 1 ¡ g1=r1. Finally, the critical capital
stock ksk(A0) is akin to Skiba's (1978) threshold, hence the superscript 'sk'.
The long run exponential growth is evidently due to the asymptotic linear rela-
tion established between knowledge generation and output (cf. (2.3) and (2.5)),
which gives rise to the linear asymptotic turnpike (4.5). As noted by Weitz-
man (1998), this asymptotic relation follows an intrinsic feature of the recombinant
knowledge generating mechanism: the power of the combinatorial functions implies
that H (the set of new seed ideas) grows faster than A. Indeed, (2.1) implies that
when _ A=A is constant, H = O(Am). Because growth is driven by knowledge, output
cannot outgrow knowledge and as the growth process proceeds, R&D expenditure
per hybrid (sY=H) shrinks and so does the probability ¼(sY=H) that the hybrid
will yield a viable progeny idea. Eventually, the number of hybrids ceases to be
a constraint and the limited resources available for R&D regulate the processing of
new ideas such that knowledge, capital, output and consumption all grow at the
same constant rate.
It is now possible to verify that the long run growth rate of (4.10) agrees with the
general result of Weitzman (1998, equation 38): g1 = F(sk
1;s1L¼0(0)). Recalling
(cf. (4.7) and (4.5)) that r1 = f0(~ ´) and L¼0(0) = 1=z(~ ´), we use (4.11), (4.12) and
10z(x) = f(x)=f0(x) ¡ x to obtain F(sk




z(~ ´)+~ ´ =
g1. Here, however, the long run investment shares (s1 and sk
1 de¯ned in (4.11) and
(4.12)) are endogenous variables that depend on the economy's underlying structure
vis-µ a-vis its production technology F, R&D e®ectiveness ¼, and the preferences
















Figure 1: Knowledge-capital processes of economies that satisfy the growth condi-
tion (4.6) when ksk(A0) < ~ k(A0). Arrows indicate direction of process evolution.
Figure 1 displays possible state-space trajectories of potentially growing economies
(that satisfy the growth condition (4.6)) when ksk(A0) < ~ k(A0). The threshold en-
dowment ksk(A0) separates economies into growing (above the threshold) and stag-
nating (below it). A growing economy with capital endowment between ksk(A0)
and ~ k(A0) will initially avoid R&D to build up capital. As soon as its capital reaches
~ k(A0), the economy tunes its consumption/saving rates so as to evolve along the
turnpike (see the appendix). If capital endowment exceeds ~ k(A0), R&D is ini-
tially ¯nanced at the maximal rate (s = 1) until the turnpike is reached, at which
time the turnpike policy is adopted. As knowledge increases, the turnpike turns
11into a straight line (the asymptotic turnpike) and the economy approaches the bal-
anced growth speci¯ed in Proposition 3. For a poorly endowed economy, with


















Figure 2: Knowledge-capital processes of economies that satisfy the growth condi-
tion (4.6) when ~ k(A0) < ksk(A0). Arrows indicate direction of process evolution.
State-space trajectories of potentially growing economies when ksk(A0) > ~ k(A0)
are depicted in Figure 2. Here it is possible that an economy with capital endowment
below ksk(A0) (but above another threshold level ka(A0)) will temporarily invest in
R&D at the maximal rate (s = 1). After a while, as capital decreases, R&D ceases
to be attractive and is terminated abruptly. From that time onward the economy
converges gradually, according to the one dimensional version of (2.8) with s = 0
and ¯xed A, to a point on the stagnation line below.
State-space trajectories of stagnating economies (that violate the growth condi-
tion (4.6)) are depicted in Figure 3. Except for capital endowments exceeding the
threshold k1(A0), R&D is not warranted and the economy approaches stagnation at
(A0;^ k(A0)). Capital endowments above k1(A0) justify maximal R&D investment
12early on. At some point above the turnpike, however, knowledge accumulation is
abruptly terminated, and the policy of decreasing capital brings the process gradu-

















Figure 3: Knowledge-capital processes of economies that violate the growth condi-
tion (4.6). Arrows indicate direction of process evolution.
5 Example
We illustrate the above results for an economy with a Cobb-Douglas production









A ´ ~ ´A:
The stagnation line (4.4) reduces to
^ k(A) = (µ®=½)
1
1¡® A ´ ^ ´A:
13The large-A capital rental rate along the turnpike (cf. (4.7)) is














Endowed with su±cient capital, an economy satisfying the growth condition will
reach the turnpike at a most-rapid-R&D rate and evolve along it thereafter. In the
long-run, output, capital, knowledge and consumption all grow exponentially at the
rate g1 = (r1¡½)=¾ by devoting to R&D and saving the constant income fractions
s1 = (1¡®)g1=r1 and sk
1 = ®g1=r1, respectively. For a Cobb-Douglas economy
the long-run income shares allocated to R&D and saving turn out to be proportional
to the knowledge and capital shares in the production function.
6 Concluding comments
We extend Weitzman's (1998) recombinant framework to include endogenous
R&D and saving decisions. Conditions under which long run growth is sustained
are derived. Growing economies admit a turnpike behavior, approaching in the long
run a balanced growth path under which the shares of income allocated to ¯nance
R&D, saving and consumption are constant. Weitzman's (1998) assumption of a
constant R&D share is thus consistent with optimizing behavior in the long run.
During earlier stages, however, R&D spending varies signi¯cantly, and can take the
extreme options of no R&D or maximal R&D.
The necessary growth condition is formulated in terms of the slopes of two
lines de¯ned in the knowledge-capital state space, relating the economy's under-
lying structure to its long run growth potential. The stagnation line marks the
14eventual states of economies that fail to grow while the turnpike traces the growth
trajectory.
Knowledge, represented by the stock of useful ideas, plays a dual role, augment-
ing labor productivity, on the one hand, and a®ecting the expected cost of producing
a useful idea, on the other. As knowledge increases, the latter approaches a con-
stant value, hence in the long run growth is driven solely by the labor augmenting
role of knowledge. This state of a®airs is manifest by the turnpike approaching a
straight line (the asymptotic turnpike) at large knowledge levels and gives rise to
the balanced, long run growth.
Growth failures occur either because the economy lacks the potential to sustain
long run growth (i.e., violates the growth condition), or when it possesses this po-
tential but lacks su±cient resources. The former situation may be due to poor
social capital such as corruption, excessive bureaucracy or insu±cient enforcement
of property rights (Hall and Jones 1999) as well as to inappropriate capacity to
exploit R&D e®ectively. External capital infusion can embark a poor, potentially-
growing economy on a path of sustained growth but economies that violate the
growth condition require structural changes in order to escape stagnation (Easterly
2003).
The method of analysis, based on the characteristic curves, is quite general and
has been applied to other endogenous growth models (Tsur and Zemel 2004, 2005).
An interesting extension of the present work might account for a competitive R&D
sector, so that knowledge accumulation does not depend entirely on public spending
and regulation policies.
15Appendix
A Proofs of Propositions 1 and 2
Propositions 1 and 2 are based on a series of properties that restrict the behavior
of the optimal (A;k) process in terms of its position relative to the characteristic
curves. These properties are derived below.
Suppressing the time argument for brevity, the current-value Hamiltonian cor-
responding to the per-capita version of (2.8) is written as
H = u(c) + ¸[(1 ¡ s)F(k;A) ¡ c] + °sF(k;A)='(A) (A.1)
where ¸ and ° are the current-value costate variables associated with k and A,
respectively. Necessary conditions for optimum include





1 if °='(A) > ¸
0 if °='(A) < ¸
~ s if °='(A) = ¸
(A.3)
(~ s is the singular R&D share de¯ned in (A.8) below),




















and the transversality conditions
(i) lim
t!1
k¸e¡½t = 0; (ii) lim
t!1
°e¡½t = 0: (A.6)
Condition (A.3) identi¯es three possible R&D regimes, namely maximal R&D
(s = 1), no R&D (s = 0) and singular R&D (s = ~ s). The optimal policy selects
16among these three regimes at di®erent phases of the planning horizon. Implementing
the singular ~ s policy during a ¯nite time interval is optimal only if the singular
condition ¸ = °='(A) holds during this interval. Taking the time derivative and
using (2.3) and (2.6), we ¯nd
_ ¸ = _ °='(A) ¡ °sF(k;A)'0(A)='(A)3: (A.7)
Using (A.4), (A.5) and the singular condition ¸ = °='(A), we write (A.7) as
Fk(k;A) = FA(k;A)='(A), which is recognized as condition (4.1) de¯ning the turn-
pike ~ k(A). Thus, the singular ~ s policy can proceed only along the turnpike and is
given, in view of (2.3) and (2.7) by
~ s = [1 ¡ c=y]'(A)=[~ k0(A) + '(A)]: (A.8)
In a steady state, _ A = 0 and (2.3) imply s = 0, which, together with _ ¸ = 0
and (A.4), gives rise to Fk = ½, in agreement with condition (4.3) that de¯nes the
stagnation line ^ k(A). Thus, if the optimal policy ever approaches a steady state,
this state must fall on the stagnation line. We state these observations for future
reference as
Property 1. (a) The singular policy ~ s can proceed only along the turnpike. (b) An
optimal steady state falls on the stagnation line.
Since Fkk < 0, the condition ½ < Fk holds below ^ k(A) (where k < ^ k(A)). Thus,
(A.3) and (A.4) imply that _ ¸ < 0 below ^ k(A). This, together with (A.2) and
u00(c) < 0, implies that _ c > 0 below the stagnation line. The reverse relations
(_ ¸ > 0 and _ c < 0) hold above ^ k(A) if s < 1. We summarize these results in
Property 2. The optimal consumption process increases in time below the stagna-
tion line in all R&D regimes and decreases in time above this line under the no-R&D
and singular regimes.
17De¯ne
¤(k;A) = Fk(k;A) ¡ FA(k;A)='(A): (A.9)
According to (4.1), the turnpike is de¯ned by ¤(~ k(A);A) = 0. Since Fkk < 0 and
FkA > 0, we ¯nd that
Property 3. ¤(k;A) > 0 below the turnpike and ¤(k;A) < 0 above it.
According to (A.3), the R&D policy is determined by the sign of » = °='(A)¡¸.
Using (A.4), (A.5) and (A.9), we ¯nd _ » = ½» + ¤(¸ + s»), which is integrated to
yield
»(t)e¡½t = »(t0)e¡½t0 +
Z t
t0
¤(k(¿);A(¿))[¸(¿) + s(¿)»(¿)]e¡½¿d¿ (A.10)
for any arbitrarily chosen initial time t0.
Since the shadow price ¸ is positive and s» ¸ 0, (see A.3), the sign of the
integrand is determined by ¤. Consider now the possibility that »(t0) > 0 while the
process evolves below the turnpike (where ¤(k;A) > 0). So long as the turnpike is
not crossed, we see from (A.10) that
»(t)e¡½t > »(t0)e¡½t0 > 0 (A.11)
hence the R&D fraction remains ¯xed at the maximum value s = 1. This capital-
decreasing regime, however, cannot cross the turnpike from below and will continue
permanently, which implies that (A.11) violates the transversality conditions (A.6).
It follows that the maximal R&D regime cannot be optimal below the turnpike.
Similar considerations rule out the possibility that the no R&D regime holds indef-
initely above the turnpike. Thus,
Property 4. (a) Maximal R&D (s = 1) can be optimal only above the turnpike.
(b) A steady state (with s = 0) cannot fall above the turnpike.
18In fact, maximal R&D can hold only during a ¯nite period, otherwise the (A;k)
process would cross the turnpike and violate Property 4a. After some time, this
regime must either be replaced by a no-R&D policy above the turnpike or reach the
turnpike (with » = 0) and switch to the singular policy.
Without R&D the capital process is monotonic in time because knowledge re-
mains constant and the problem is essentially one-dimensional. Above the turnpike,
the no-R&D policy involves decreasing capital (by consuming in excess of produc-
tion) until the turnpike is reached (because by increasing k this regime would remain
inde¯nitely above the turnpike, violating (A.6)). Now, » must be negative when
the turnpike is reached from above under this policy. Since no other regime holds
below the turnpike, this k-decreasing, constant-A plan must continue and converge
to a steady state on the stagnation line segment below the turnpike.
Initiated below the turnpike, a no-R&D process cannot cross it. Neither can it
switch to another regime below the turnpike. The only two possibilities left are to
converge to a steady state below the turnpike or to reach the turnpike (with » = 0)
and switch to the turnpike policy. We summarize these considerations in
Property 5. (a) A maximal R&D policy initiated above the turnpike can proceed
only during a ¯nite time interval, following which it is replaced by either a no-R&D
policy (above the turnpike) or a singular policy (on the turnpike). (b) A no-R&D
policy initiated above the turnpike continues permanently and the ensuing (A;k)
process converges to a steady state on the stagnation line segment below the turnpike.
(c) A no-R&D policy initiated below the turnpike either drives the (A,k) process to a
steady state on the stagnation line (below the turnpike) or is replaced by the singular
policy upon reaching the turnpike.
Once the singular policy has been initiated along the turnpike (with » = 0 and
19_ » = 0) we ¯nd, using (A.10), that the (A;k) process cannot leave the turnpike with-
out violating Properties 4 or 5 (in other words, the singular policy is trapping). In
view of Property 1, this policy can either converge to a steady state at the intersec-
tion point ( ^ A;^ k) of ~ k(A) and ^ k(A) (if such a point exists) or grow inde¯nitely along
the turnpike. The ¯rst possibility can be ruled out. Consider a singular policy
con¯ned inde¯nitely to the turnpike segment above the stagnation line. According
to Property 2, this involves a decreasing consumption process. However, the pol-
icy of staying at the initial state (diverting to consumption the resources allocated
by the singular policy to increase the capital and knowledge stocks) is feasible and
yields a higher utility. Therefore, the singular policy that drives the (A;K) process
permanently above the stagnation line is not optimal. The geometry of the charac-
teristic curves of the present model is such that the turnpike can cross the stagnation
line only from above (see the discussion following (4.5)). It follows that a singular
process converging to ( ^ A;^ k) always lies above ^ k(A) and cannot be optimal. These
considerations imply
Property 6. A singular policy cannot be con¯ned to a turnpike segment above the
stagnation line and must proceed inde¯nitely along the turnpike.
When the growth condition (4.6) is violated, the stagnation line lies below the
turnpike at all knowledge levels. From Property 6 we conclude that
Property 7. (a) When the growth condition (4.6) is violated, the singular policy
cannot be optimal. (b) When the growth condition (4.6) is satis¯ed, the singular
policy implies sustained growth.
We can now use these properties to derive Propositions 1 and 2. Observe that
capital and knowledge can grow simultaneously only under the singular regime.
20Proof of Proposition 1: Follows from Properties 1, 4a, 5 and 6.
Proof of Proposition 2: When condition (4.6) is violated, Property 7a forbids
the singular policy. According to (A.3) the economy can either engage in maximal
R&D (s = 1) or no R&D (s = 0). Since the ¯rst possibility can only be implemented
temporarily (Property 5a) the no-R&D policy must eventually be implemented and,
according to Property 5b-c, the economy approaches a steady state on the stagnation
line. When the growth condition (4.6) holds, the singular policy cannot be ruled
out and the economy bears the potential to sustain long run growth.
B Proof of Proposition 3
The proof is based on the following derivation of the turnpike investment-consumption
decisions. Along the turnpike, capital changes with knowledge according to ~ k(A)
of (4.2). Letting a 0~0 symbol over any variable represent its turnpike trajectory,
(2.3) is rewritten as
_ A = ~ s~ y(A)='(A); (B.1)
where
~ y(A) = F(~ k(A);A) = Af(~ k(A)=A) (B.2)
and (2.7) takes the form
_ ~ k = (1 ¡ ~ s)~ y(A) ¡ ~ c = ~ k0(A) _ A = ~ k0(A)~ s~ y(A)='(A): (B.3)
The turnpike consumption ~ c is thus given by
~ c = ~ y(A)[1 ¡ ~ s('(A) + ~ k0(A))='(A)] (B.4)
which implies
d~ c=d~ s = ¡~ y(A)('(A) + ~ k0(A))='(A): (B.5)
21From (B.2) we ¯nd
~ y0(A) = FA(~ k(A);A) + Fk(~ k(A);A)~ k0(A) = ~ r(A)('(A) + ~ k0(A)); (B.6)
where it is recalled that FA = Fk'(A) holds along the turnpike and
~ r(A) = Fk(~ k(A);A): (B.7)
The turnpike policy is the outcome of





subject to (B.1) and (B.4), 0 · ~ s · '(A)=('(A) + ~ k0(A)) and other feasibility
(e.g., non-negativity) constraints, given the endowment A(0) = A0. Let ~ m be the
current-value shadow price of knowledge along the turnpike. The current-value
Hamiltonian is
~ H = u(~ c) + ~ m~ s~ y(A)='(A) (B.9)
and necessary conditions for internal optimum include (see B.5)
u0(~ c) =
~ m
'(A) + ~ k0(A)
; (B.10)
_ ~ m ¡ ½~ m = ¡@H=@A, which reduces, noting (B.4), (B.6) and (B.10), to
_ ~ m
~ m
= ½ ¡ ~ r(A) +
~ s~ y(A)('0(A) + ~ k00(A))
('(A) + ~ k0(A))'(A)
(B.11)
and the transversality condition (Michel 1982)
lim
t!1
~ H(t)e¡½t = 0: (B.12)
Taking the time derivative of (B.10) gives
u00(~ c)_ ~ c('(A) + ~ k0(A)) + u0(~ c)('0(A) + ~ k00(A))~ s~ y(A)='(A) = _ ~ m;




~ r ¡ ½
~ ¾
´ ~ g; (B.13)
where ~ ¾(~ c) = ¡~ cu00(~ c)=u0(~ c) is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
De¯ne
q(A) = ~ s('(A) + ~ k0(A))='(A) (B.14)
and rewrite (B.4) as
~ c = ~ y(A)(1 ¡ q(A)); (B.15)
so that q is the income share invested in capital and knowledge along the turnpike.
Taking the time derivative of (B.15), using (B.1) and (B.6), we ¯nd
_ ~ c = ~ y~ rq(1 ¡ q) ¡ ~ y _ q: (B.16)
Dividing (B.16) by (B.15) gives
_ q=(1 ¡ q) ¡ ~ rq + ~ g = 0: (B.17)






= ~ rq (B.18)
and integrating, recalling that ~ y = ~ c=(1 ¡ q) (see B.15), we obtain






for any t ¸ t0 ¸ 0. Thus, output grows exponentially when the rate ~ r and the
income share q approach their constant asymptotic values.
To verify that the share q is asymptotically constant, we recall that according
to (4.7) and (4.9), the large A and c limits of ~ r and ~ ¾ are given by r1 and ¾,
respectively. Noting (B.13), we ¯nd that as the economy grows ~ g approaches
g1 = (r1 ¡ ½)=¾; (B.20)
23in agreement with (4.10). We can now return to (B.17) with the constant parameters
~ r = r1 and ~ g = g1 and obtain the general solution along the asymptotic turnpike
q(t) =
1 + Ãexp[(r1 ¡ g1)t]
r1=g1 + Ãexp[(r1 ¡ g1)t]
;
where Ã is an integration constant. Excluding solutions that diverge at a ¯nite time
and recalling that r1 > g1, we ¯nd that any Ã 6= 0 gives rise to q ! 1, implying
that the long run consumption share shrinks to zero. This solution, however, cannot
be optimal because (B.19) implies that ~ y grows at the rate r1 while ~ m shrinks at
the rate ½ ¡ r1, hence the second term of the Hamiltonian (B.9) grows at the rate
½, violating (B.12). Thus, Ã = 0, q = g1=r1 and (B.19) implies that in the long

















1 + ~ ´L¼0(0)
¶
; (B.22)
verifying (4.11) and (4.12). With ~ k(A) approaching ~ k1(A) = ~ ´A, (B.2) implies
that knowledge and capital are proportional to ~ y and grow at the same rate g1.
To understand the Skiba behavior when the characteristic curves cross, note,
using Properties 1 and 4b, that there exists a minimal knowledge level A0 · Am · ^ A
such that when initiated from (Am;~ k(Am)) on the turnpike, the optimal process
must follow the singular policy of unbounded growth. When Am > A0, the critical
level ksk(A0) is obtained by solving the dynamic equations for A, k and ¸ backward
in time with s = 1, using the initial values A = Am and k = ~ k(Am) and the initial
value of ¸ determined by the condition that the no R&D policy (s = 0) that drives
the system from (Am;~ k(Am)) to a steady state (Am;^ k(Am)) on the stagnation line
is also optimal. The Skiba point ksk(A0) corresponds to the capital stock at the
24(reversed) time when the knowledge endowment A0 is reached, and lies above ~ k(A0),
as shown in Figure 2. When Am = A0, the Skiba point lies between ~ k(A0) and
^ k(A0), as shown in Figure 1. If the endowment ^ k(A0) justi¯es increasing capital
until the turnpike is reached, followed by singular growth thereafter, set ksk(A0) = 0.
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